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UNLAWFUL REPRIEVE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 747 OF THE
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT
J. Michael Morgalis*

I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2009, President Barack Obama declared his strong opposition
to congressional measures aimed at restoring dealerships terminated in
the Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler) and General Motors (GM)
bankruptcies. 1 Further, the Obama Administration stated that such
congressional action would create “dangerous precedent” because of the
possible intervention into closed judicial bankruptcy proceedings. 2
Despite this opposition, in December 2009 Congress passed a bill
providing rejected car dealerships a chance for reinstatement by
appealing their cases to an arbitrator. 3 The result of the legislation has
been twofold: on the one hand, hundreds of dealerships have been
reinstated; however, on the other hand, the bill has raised questions
regarding Congress’s constitutional authority to enact such a bill. 4 This
Comment will focus on the latter and suggests that Congress acted
unconstitutionally when it enacted Section 747 of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act. Specifically, congressional action seemingly
reopened final judicial judgments from the Chrysler and GM bankruptcy
proceedings, and the consequences of its actions could create a
* Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review; A.B. Harvard College.
The author would like to thank Professor Aaron Bryant for his suggestion of the topic and his guidance;
Professor Michael Solimine for his global comments and reference to important sources of information;
and Professor Kristin Kalsem for her comments. Also, many thanks to Jonah Knobler, Esq. for his
editing efforts.
1. Brian Faler, Obama Opposes House Plan to Protect Chrysler, GM Dealerships,
BLOOMBERG, July 15, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aioxPp9w.vzM; Ken Thomas, Obama Auto Task Force Warns Against Dealer Plan, CRAIN’S DETROIT
BUS., July 21, 2009, http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20090721/ FREE/907219975# (stating that
Chrysler and GM “had far too many dealers relative to the number of cars they were selling” and that
the average Toyota dealer was selling four times as many vehicles as the average Chevrolet dealer).
2. Thomas, supra note 1.
3. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2009).
4. Tom Krisher, Chrysler to Let 50 Dealers Rejoin Sales Network, ABC NEWS, Mar. 26, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10209751 [hereinafter Krisher, 50 Dealers]; Tom
Krisher, More U.S. Dealers Appeal Chrysler, GM Shutdowns, MANUFACTURING.NET, Jan. 22, 2010,
http://www.manufacturing.net/News-More-Dealers-Appeal-Chrysler-GM-Shutdowns-012210.aspx
[hereinafter Krisher, Dealers Appeal].
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precedent allowing for similar acts in the future.
In early 2009, Chrysler and GM faced declining revenues and an
inability to pay their creditors. As a result, each filed for bankruptcy in
the spring of 2009 under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 5 Within
forty days of their respective bankruptcy filings, Chrysler and GM
successfully completed their transactions that created the entities “New
Chrysler” and “New GM.” 6 In forming these new entities, each car
manufacturer abrogated a large number of franchise agreements within
their dealership networks to become more cost-effective and
competitive. 7 Dealerships objected to such actions but were unable to
persuade the bankruptcy court to reinstate their agreements. 8
Subsequently, Congress sought information explaining why certain
dealerships were closed and on what grounds. 9 Congress eventually
responded to the termination of thousands of dealerships by enacting
Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 10 which provided
potential remedies for discontinued dealerships via an arbitration process
with either Chrysler or GM. Since the passage of the bill, Chrysler and
GM have granted reprieve to hundreds of arbitration-eligible dealerships
that were scheduled to be eliminated through the reorganization process
of each company. 11 Thus, this legislation allowed car dealerships,
permissibly terminated in bankruptcy proceedings, to circumvent the
final judgments issued by the Southern District of New York
Bankruptcy Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
This Comment argues that Congress’s enactment of Section 747 of
Consolidated Appropriations Act is unconstitutional as it pertains to the
separation of powers. Part II of this Comment outlines the jurisprudence
of bankruptcy courts as well as their inherent authority despite being
non-Article III judges. It also discusses the GM and Chrysler
bankruptcy court decisions and Congress’s reaction. Part III considers
two prominent Supreme Court cases dealing with congressional actions
5. Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy; U.A.W. and Fiat to Take
Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009 at A1; Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Obama is Upbeat for G.M.
Future on Day of Pain, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009 at A1.
6. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Chrysler Gets Judge’s Approval for Asset Sale, WASH. POST, June
1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/01/AR2009060100804.html;
Steven Mufson & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Post-Bankruptycy GM Will Have Work Cut Out For It,
WASH. POST, July 7, 2009, at A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/
2009/07/06/AR2009070600450.html.
7. Associated Press, GM Begins Announcing its 1,100 Dealership Closures, FOX NEWS, May
15, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520281,00.html.
8. In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 515 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
9. H.R. RES. 591, 111th Cong. (2009).
10. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2009).
11. Krisher, 50 Dealers, supra note 4.
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to reopen or limit judicial decisions.
Part IV examines the
constitutionality of Section 747, a provision that offered Chrysler and
GM car dealerships retroactive opportunity for arbitration. Finally, Part
V concludes that the measures taken by Congress were unconstitutional,
but because of the unique relationship between the car companies and
the federal government, no legal actions will likely ensue. Without a
challenge to Congress’s authority to circumvent final judicial decisions,
precedent will exist allowing for similar behavior in the future.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the issues raised by Section 747 of Consolidated
Appropriations Act and the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, it is
necessary to discuss the jurisprudence surrounding bankruptcy courts
and their authority to grant final decisions. This Part first discusses the
Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co. 12 Next, it outlines Congress’s reaction to
Northern Pipeline, which essentially codified the Court’s holding and
established the bankruptcy infrastructure still intact today. This Part
then describes the Chrysler and GM bankruptcy decisions. Finally, it
analyzes the bill Congress passed in response to the automotive
bankruptcy proceedings.
A. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
In Northern Pipeline, the Court considered whether the jurisdictional
grant to bankruptcy judges in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violated
Article III of the Constitution. 13 The Act prescribed that bankruptcy
judges were to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate for terms of fourteen years. 14 The judges were subject to
removal for extreme behavior and their salaries statutorily set. 15 The
Act also granted bankruptcy judges jurisdiction over all civil
proceedings brought under or arising under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 16 Panels of three judges could also be established to
hear appeals of final judgments, orders, decrees, and interlocutory

12. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
13. Id. at 52.
14. Id. at 53.
15. Id. The salaries could be adjusted through the Federal Salary Act. Judges could be removed
for “‘incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty or physical or mental disability.’” Id. (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)).
16. Id. at 54 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)).
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appeals. 17
When considering the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act, the
Court cited Article III of the Constitution, which states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall,
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. 18

From this clause the Court concluded it was the Framers’ intent to have
an independent judiciary that enjoys life tenure with fixed and
irreducible compensation. 19 Because under the Bankruptcy Act the
bankruptcy judges were not given life tenure and their compensation
could be reduced, the Court found that the judges were clearly not
Article III judges. 20 The Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Act
impermissibly removed judicial power from Article III courts and gave
that power to non-Article III adjunct courts. 21
B. Congress’s Response to Northern Pipeline
On July 10, 1984, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. 22
Pursuant to the statute, in each
judicial district, bankruptcy courts would constitute a unit of the district
court. 23 The Act stated that bankruptcy judges were to be appointed by
the United States court of appeals of the circuit in which a particular
district was located. 24 The judges were to have terms of fourteen years
and serve as judicial officers of the United States district court
established under Article III of the Constitution. 25 However, bankruptcy
judges could be removed during their term for “incompetence,
misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability” when a
majority of the judicial council of the circuit in which the judge’s
official duty station is located support the removal. 26 Bankruptcy judges
17. Id. at 55 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 160, 1482 (1976 ed., Supp. IV)).
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, quoted in N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58–59.
19. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 61.
21. Id. at 87. Such courts are also called Article I courts.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2006). The appointments are to be based on the recommendations of
the Judicial Conference. Id.
25. Id.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006).
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were appointed to work full-time and receive a salary at the annual rate
determined by statute. 27
The Act further stipulated that district courts could refer any or all
cases that arose or related to a case under Chapter 11 to the bankruptcy
judges of that district. 28 Once presented with a case under Chapter 11,
bankruptcy judges could enter appropriate orders and judgments (that
were subject to review) for any core proceedings. 29
The Act gave the federal district courts jurisdiction to hear appeals
from final judgments, orders, and decrees entered by bankruptcy
judges. 30 However, a panel of bankruptcy judges could comprise an
appellate panel so long as a majority of district judges in the district of
the appeal authorized such an appeal. 31 The Act also gave the courts of
appeals jurisdiction over appeals of all final decisions, judgments,
orders, and decrees when certain issues have not been previously
addressed, when a split among courts exists on an issue, or when an
immediate appeal may materially advance the progress of the case or
proceeding in which the appeal is taken. 32
Despite some minor amendments, the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 remains in force today. The Act
addressed the exact holding of Northern Pipeline, leaving no doubt that
bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges. However, despite
bankruptcy judges being inferior to Article III judges in the eyes of the
Constitution, the Act’s language seemingly permits bankruptcy judges to
issue final judgments, which is important for the purpose of this
Comment. 33 Additionally, the Act outlines the conditions under which

27. 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006). The current version reads: “a salary at an annual rate that is equal
to 92 percent of the salary of a judge of the district court of the United States as determined pursuant to
section 135 [28 U.S.C. § 135 (2006)], to be paid at such times as the Judicial Conference of the United
States determines.” 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2006).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006). Core proceedings can include such things as: matters
concerning the administration of the estate; allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or
exemptions from property of the estate; counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against
the estate; orders in respect to obtaining credit; orders to turn over property of the estate; proceedings to
determine, avoid, or recover preferences; motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances; determinations as to the
dischargeability of particular debts; objections to discharges; determinations of the validity, extent, or
priority of liens; confirmations of plans; orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use
of cash collateral. Id. § (b)(2)(A–M). However, a bankruptcy judge could hear a non-core proceeding
where the case was related to Title 11. Id. § (c)(1). Cases, with consent of both parties, could also be
referred from the district courts to the bankruptcy courts. Id. § (c)(2).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b–c) (2006).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(a) (2006).
33. While 28 U.S.C. § 158 does not define what constitutes a final decision, case law is
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appeals may be heard by appellate courts, which is important in the
context of the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies.
C. Reorganization of Chrysler and GM
1. Dire Financial Struggles
By early 2009, it was apparent that Chrysler and GM would not
survive despite billions of dollars in federal funding they received the
previous fiscal year. 34 Because of their financial troubles, both
automobile giants had essentially one option: file for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. However, unlike many
Chapter 11 filings, the Chrysler and GM scenarios were different
because neither company could fiscally sustain a long, drawn-out
bankruptcy process. 35
Chrysler and GM were faced with liquidating their assets and
receiving roughly 10% of book value for those assets or agreeing to be
purchased by third parties including the United States Treasury, Canada,
Ontario, and Fiat. 36 However, liquidation could have been a “disastrous
result” 37 for the creditors of both companies leaving as the only practical
choice the sale of their assets under § 363(b) of Chapter 11.38
Traditionally, companies in Chapter 11 must submit a reorganization
plan for the bankruptcy court to approve prior to a sale of assets;
however, § 363 allows for debtors to sell their assets without submitting
a plan in certain situations. 39
The economic environment leading up to the GM and Chrysler
bankruptcies made evident the urgency and necessity for a quick sale of
assets. First, President Obama’s statements made clear that time was
critical:

instructive on the matter. Courts have found that the confirmation of organization plans is a final
judgment. See Holsten v. Brill, 987 F.2d 1268, 1270 (7th Cir. 1993); Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc.
v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1354 (7th Cir. 1990); Sanders Confectionery Prods. v. Heller
Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 480 (6th Cir. 1992). Courts have also held that 11 U.S.C. § 363 sales are final
decisions. See In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 1986); Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387
F.3d 721, 732 (8th Cir. 2004); Gekas v. Pipin (In re Met-L-Wood Corp.), 861 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1988).
34. See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89–91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
35. See In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, Parker v.
Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
36. Id. at 481–83.
37. Id. at 474.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). The bankruptcy code is complex and beyond the scope of this
Comment; however, this subsection will present enough information about the Chrysler and GM
bankruptcies for the reader to analyze Part IV of this Comment.
39. See In re Chysler, 405 B.R. at 94–96.
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What I’m talking about is using our existing legal structure as a tool
that, with the backing of the U.S. Government, can make it easier for
General Motors . . . to quickly clear away old debts that are weighing [it]
down so that [it] can get back on [its] feet and onto a path to success . . . .
What I’m not talking about is a process where a company is simply
broken up, sold off, and no longer exists. We’re not talking about that.
And what I’m not talking about is a company that’s stuck in court for
years, unable to get out. 40

Second, a successful sale quickly accomplished would help the
companies avoid systemic failure, allow for continued employment of
many Americans and restore consumer confidence in Chrysler and GM
products. 41 Finally, there was a lack of merger partners, acquirers, and
investors willing and able to acquire the automobile companies,
especially through a potentially long and tenuous bankruptcy. 42 Given
this environment, the court approved both transactions finding no
realistic alternatives available. 43
2. The Chrysler Transaction
With the establishment of New Chrysler and the transaction that
closed on June 10, 2009, the United States Treasury had a 9.85% stake
while Export Development Canada had 2.46%. 44 The new retirement
pension of the autoworkers—VEBA—had a 67.69% ownership interest
and Fiat held 20%, with an opportunity to acquire more. 45 The
transaction also included the transfer of most of the operating assets
from Chrysler to New Chrysler. 46 For consideration, New Chrysler paid
$2 billion to Chrysler and assumed many of its liabilities. 47
3. The GM Transaction
Under the terms of sale finalized on July 10, 2009, New GM acquired
all of GM’s assets with the exception of some cash, equity interests in
other entities, property, and employee benefit plans. 48 New GM also
assumed certain liabilities from the old entity in the areas of product
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 479.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 484.
Id.
In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 92 n.11.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 481.
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liability claims, warranty and recall obligations and all employee related
obligations. 49 The terms of the deal stipulated that the United States
Treasury would own 60.8% of the common stock as well as $2.1 billion
of New GM Series A preferred stock. Export Development of Canada
would own 11.7% of New GM’s common stock on an undiluted basis,
as well as $400 million of New GM Series A Preferred Stock. 50 The
preexisting GM entity would own 10–12% of New GM’s common stock
and the remaining 17.5% of common stock would be owned by the New
Employees Beneficiary Association Trust. 51
4. Rejected Dealer Franchise Agreements
For GM, the § 363 transaction included the assignment of dealer
franchise agreements for 4,100 of its 6,000 dealerships to New GM.52
These franchise agreements were modified to help make GM more
competitive. 53 However, New GM could not take every dealership on
the same basis, so it had the option of either terminating certain
agreements or agreeing to modified versions, known as “Participation
Agreements.” 54 For the dealerships that New GM would not go forward
with, GM provided seventeen months notice before their “Deferred
Termination Agreements” would be terminated. 55 Both participation
and deferred termination agreements included waivers of dealers’ rights
in connection with their franchises. 56
In addressing the Chrysler dealerships, the court was terse in its
description of the process surrounding the franchise agreements to be
rejected in the proposed transaction. 57 However, the court’s opinion did
reference a motion by Chrysler from May 14, 2009 in which Chrysler
sought to reject executory contracts and unexpired leases affecting 789
domestic car dealerships. 58 Approximately 3,200 dealerships were in
operation at the time Chrysler filed bankruptcy. 59

49. Id.
50. Id. at 482.
51. Id. at 482–83.
52. Id. at 476.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. There is no section devoted to describing the Chrysler dealership network.
58. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
59. Peter Valdes-Dapena, Chrysler Closing 789 Dealerships, CNNMONEY.COM, May 15, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/14/autos/chrysler_dealer_closings/index.htm.
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D. Dealership Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy
In the GM case, Bankruptcy Judge Robert E. Gerber addressed the
claim that the termination of executory contracts between GM and
Judge Gerber
certain dealerships was coerced and unlawful. 60
responded to the notion that the terminations were coerced by reminding
the objecting parties that federal bankruptcy policy permits debtors, for
the benefit of all creditors, to alter creditor and counterparty contractual
rights. 61 Next, the judge stated that for decades counterparties have had
knowledge that their executory contracts could be rejected by
bankruptcy debtors. 62 Judge Gerber also refused to prohibit the
modifications and rejections to dealership franchise agreements because
such action would be “squarely inconsistent” with the purpose of
corporate reorganizations. 63
Finally, the court relied on Judge
Gonzalez’s opinion from the Chrysler bankruptcy case that suggested
that the rejection of dealership agreements was a valid exercise of
business judgment. 64
The court also addressed the legality of rejecting executory contracts
when such rejection could violate state franchise laws. 65 The court
stated that where state laws frustrate the purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 365,
they are preempted by federal bankruptcy law. 66 Specifically, “to the
extent that laws . . . —either state or federal—impair the ability to reject,
or to assume and assign [franchise agreements], they must be trumped
by federal bankruptcy law.” 67 The court thus found the rejection of
executory franchise agreements to be far from extraordinary within the
reorganization process and concluded that making dealerships more
competitive was not a bad thing, but rather, precisely the point. 68
Despite the court’s refusal to reverse the termination of Chrysler and

60. In re General Motors, 407 B.R. at 513. Interestingly, the party raising this issue was a nonGM dealership that wanted the dealership agreements reinstated because GM was gaining a competitive
advantage by being permitted to go through bankruptcy. Thus, it seems their argument was to allow
GM to proceed in hopes they would become insolvent, lessening competition in the auto industry.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 514.
63. Id. at 515.
64. Id. The business judgment rule generally states that so long as the leaders of a corporation do
not make a decision that no other reasonable person would make, courts will defer to their judgment
because they are in the best situation to know what is in their corporation’s best interest.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 205–06 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2009)) (“Where a
state law ‘unduly impede[s] the operation of federal bankruptcy policy, the state law will have to
yield.’”).
68. Id. at 516.
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GM dealerships, many dealerships still found the process unfair. Their
cause was strengthened by members of Congress, who demanded that
Chrysler and GM provide the criteria used to reject franchise
agreements. 69 The ground was thus laid for Congress to take action to
help alleviate the concerns of the thousands of dealerships affected by
the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies.
E. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010
On December 16, 2009, Congress passed the Consolidated
Appropriations Act. 70 The bill contained a myriad of appropriations for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010. This Comment will focus on
Section 747 of the Act, which deals with the arbitration process for those
dealerships terminated through the Chrysler and GM Chapter 11
proceedings.
Section 747 begins by defining key terms. First, a “covered
manufacturer” is defined as either an automobile manufacturer in which
the United States has an ownership interest, a manufacturer to whom the
United States has provided financial assistance under the Emergency
Stabilization Act, or an automobile manufacturer “which acquired more
than half of the assets of an automobile manufacturer in which the
United States Government has an ownership interest.” 71 A “covered
dealership” is one that had a franchise agreement for selling and
servicing a particular brand or brands of a “covered manufacturer,” but
had said agreement terminated, not assigned to another brand, not
renewed, or not continued from October 3, 2008 through December 31,
2010. 72
Section 747 also states that covered manufacturers, within thirty days
of the passage of the bill, had to provide all covered dealerships not
lawfully terminated prior to April 29, 2009 73 with criteria for why they
were terminated, not renewed, or not assumed and assigned to a covered
69. See H.R. RES. 591, 111th Cong. (2009).
70. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034 (2009).
71. Id. § 747(a)(1)(A)–(B). Interestingly, this language essentially applies to only Chrysler and
GM, yet the two are not referenced by name within the statutory language.
72. Id. § 747(a)(2).
73. The usage of April 29, 2009 is extremely perplexing. The public, as well as the dealerships
themselves, only knew about the affected dealerships in the middle of May 2009. See Valdes-Dapena,
supra note 59. Moreover, in looking at those dealerships that took advantage of the arbitration available
to them in Section 747, it would appear that the numbers match those that were announced in the middle
of May 2009. Thus, the date seems to be entirely based on Chrysler’s filing for bankruptcy, which was
April 30, 2009. In other words, this was the latest date that Congress could put in the statute without
blatantly butting heads with the decisions pursuant to the automobile manufacturers respective Chapter
11 bankruptcy proceedings.
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manufacturer. 74 Any qualifying dealer could elect to seek a binding
arbitration within forty days of the passage of the bill against a covered
manufacturer. 75 Once a dealer elected to pursue arbitration, the case had
to commence as soon as was practicable and then be submitted for a
decision by the arbitrator no later than 180 days after passage of the
bill. 76
The statute further provided that the two parties could select an
arbitrator from the Regional Office of the American Arbitration
Association in the region in which the dealership was located. 77 The
arbitration was to be conducted in the state where the dealership was
located. 78 Further, each party was responsible for its own expenses,
fees, and costs, with the parties splitting equally all costs associated with
the arbitration, such as arbitrator fees, meeting room charges, and
administrative costs. 79 No arbitration could result in the arbitrator
awarding compensatory, punitive, or exemplary damages. 80
Once in arbitration, dealers and manufacturers could present any
relevant information they deemed necessary to argue their agreement
was wrongfully terminated, and the arbitrator could balance the
economic interests of the dealers, manufacturers, and the public at large
when considering reinstating a dealership. 81 The arbitrator was also to
examine seven factors before issuing each decision: (1) profitability of
the dealership for the previous four years; (2) the manufacturer’s overall
business plan; (3) the dealership’s current economic viability; (4) the
dealership’s performance vis-à-vis the objectives within its franchise
agreement; (5) the demographic and geographic characteristics of the
dealership’s market territory; (6) the dealership’s performance in
relation to the criteria used by the manufacturer to terminate, not renew,
not assume, or not assign the covered dealership’s franchise agreement;
and (7) the length of experience of the dealership.82
The Section also required arbitrators to issue written determinations
74. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 747(c), 123 Stat. 3034
(2009).
75. Id. § 747(d).
76. Id. However, for good cause, that period can be extended an additional thirty days. Id. A
dealer and manufacturer can opt to voluntarily enter into a binding agreement after their own
negotiations; however, such an agreement will represent a waiver of the dealership’s rights to pursue
arbitration pursuant to Section 747. Id. § 747(f).
77. Id. § 747(e).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 747(d). The American Arbitration Association is neither an Article I nor an Article III
court.
82. Id.
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no later than seven business days after a case had been fully submitted. 83
The written determination of the arbitrator had to include: (1) a
description of the dealership; (2) a clear statement that indicated whether
the franchise agreement in dispute was to be renewed, continued,
assigned, or assumed by a covered manufacturer; (3) the key facts relied
upon in making the determination; and (4) an explanation of how the
arbitrator’s decision was supported by the balance of economic
interests. 84 If an arbitrator decided in favor of a dealership, upon
completion of necessary agreements and prerequisites, the dealership
was to return any financial compensation previously provided by a
manufacturer for its decision to terminate, not renew, not assign or not
assume the covered dealership’s applicable franchise agreement. 85
The enactment of Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act
appears to be an attempt by Congress to bypass the bankruptcy decisions
of Chrysler and GM. As the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 makes clear, bankruptcy courts have the ability to
issue final decisions. Using case law, the next Part addresses Congress’s
ability to explicitly enact legislation that effectively limits the powers of
the Judiciary.
III. LEADING SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
The Supreme Court has dealt with the separation of powers issues
between Congress and the Judiciary on two occasions relevant to this
Comment. The first arose from the return of property captured by the
United States government during the Civil War to the original
Confederate owners. In United States v. Klein, the Court addressed a
congressional act aimed at limiting the ability of courts to hear evidence
of former Confederates’ new oaths of allegiance to the United States.86
The second case involved a statue of limitation issue that barred a
plaintiff from bringing a fraud and deceit claim under the Securities
Exchange Act. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Incorporated, the Court
found unconstitutional an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act to
reopen final judgments of Article III courts. 87 Each case will be
discussed in detail below.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. § 747(e).
Id. § 747(d).
Id. § 747(e).
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 246 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/13

12

Morgalis: UNLAWFUL REPRIEVE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTIO
MORGALIS FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3

2010]

UNLAWFUL REPRIEVE

4/4/2011 12:03 PM

837

A. United States v. Klein
During and after the Civil War, Congress focused on reconstructing
the Union. One particular issue was how to address the proceeds of
abandoned and captured property that the U.S. gained possession of
during the war. The government was forced to devise a way that
Southerners, some of whom were formerly loyal to the Confederacy,
could retain their property.
In its first attempt to distribute property back to its rightful owners,
Congress passed an act (Act I) on July 17, 1862 authorizing the
President to extend pardon and amnesty to all persons who may have
participated in the existing rebellion, with exceptions that he may deem
convenient for the public welfare. 88 Congress then passed the
Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863 (Act II),
which allowed for the retention of property as long as the use of that
property was not for carrying on war against the United States. 89 With
proof that one had never given aid or comfort to the rebellion, one class
of individuals could retrieve their property. 90
Finally, almost a year and a half after Congress had given the
President the authority to pardon, President Lincoln, on December 8,
1863, issued a proclamation that offered a full pardon, with restoration
of all property rights, to qualifying individuals previously engaged in
rebellion as actual participants or as aiders and abettors. 91 After a series
of amended pardons via a proclamation, on December 25, 1868, the
President issued a pardon available without exception, unconditionally,
and without reservation to all who participated in the rebellion with no
oath requirement. 92
Congress, perhaps uncomfortable with former Confederates being
granted leniency, repealed Act I, which authorized the President to
pardon any and all with any conditions or qualifications he saw fit.93
The Klein Court found this act of Congress to have little if any effect on
the President’s pardon, as it would not reduce any obligations of
Congress under the Constitution to give Lincoln’s proclamation its full

88. Klein, 80 U.S at 130.
89. Id. at 130–31. Arms, ships, steamboats, military supplies, and munitions were examples of
excluded property to be returned. Id. at 131.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 131–32. The pardon was contingent on individuals taking an oath that promised that
they would thereafter abide by and support the Constitution of the United States, all acts of Congress,
and all proclamations of the President in reference to slaves. Id. at 132.
92. Id. at 141.
93. Id.
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intended effect. 94 Moreover, the Court could not envision a scenario in
which those who had taken the oath would not be entitled to their
property. 95 The Klein Court stated that once the oath was taken, an
individual had an absolute right to the restoration of his political rights
and to deny the same would be a breach of faith by the government. 96
With these facts in mind, the Court analyzed Klein’s case. During the
rebellion, V.F. Wilson had become the surety on bonds of several
members of the Confederate army. 97 After President Lincoln’s
proclamation on December 8, 1863, V.F. Wilson took an oath of
allegiance. 98 After Wilson’s death in 1965, Klein, the administrator of
Wilson’s estate, filed a petition in the Court of Claims to obtain the
proceeds of the cotton that Wilson had abandoned to the Treasury of the
United States. 99 In May 1869, the Court of Claims found Wilson’s
estate was entitled to receive the proceeds of his cotton and allotted
$125,300 to Klein. 100 The United States appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. 101
While the appeal was pending, Congress passed a provision within a
general appropriations bill that attempted to use the acceptance of a
pardon as conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned, but not, however, as
evidence of the rights conferred by the pardon in the Court of Claims102
or in the Supreme Court. 103 The proviso also stated that:
[p]roof of loyalty is required to be made according to the provisions of
certain statutes, irrespective of the effect of any executive proclamation,
pardon, or amnesty, or act of oblivion; and when judgment has been
already rendered on other proof of loyalty, the Supreme Court, on appeal,
shall have no further jurisdiction of the cause, and shall dismiss the same
for want of jurisdiction. 104

The Court saw the proviso of Congress as an attempt to deny the
pardons granted by the presidential proclamations which Congress had
94. Id. at 142.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 132.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Klein Court describes the history of the court of claims as originally assisting in the
preparation of bills to be submitted to Congress. However, the court of claims grew to have a larger
jurisdiction and was authorized to render final judgments. The court of claims thus exercised all the
functions of a court, but was still an inferior court authorized by Congress. Id. at 145.
103. Id. at 144.
104. Id. at 143.
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originally authorized. 105 Further, the language unambiguously denied
the Court jurisdiction when certain circumstances presented themselves,
which the Court said was “not an exercise of the acknowledged power of
Congress.” 106
To support its claim, the Court referenced its decision in
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co. In Wheeling, the Court found that
the bridge in question was a nuisance. 107 Subsequently, Congress
passed an act legalizing the bridge and making it a “post-road.” 108 The
Court denied a motion to enforce its original holding, as it found that the
bridge was no longer a nuisance because of a constitutionally
permissible action taken by Congress. 109 The Court distinguished the
act at issue in Wheeling from the proviso now before it by observing that
the Wheeling Court had found that Congress did not act arbitrarily and
that the congressional act in Wheeling had created a set of new
circumstances. 110 In the Klein Court’s eyes, however, Congress’s
actions dealing with the evidentiary value of presidential pardons did not
create a set of new circumstances. 111
The Court also referenced the Constitution’s language within Article
III, which states “in all cases other than those of original jurisdiction,
‘the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and
fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress
shall make.’” 112 From this language, Congress has the power to amend
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, but in the instance of the Court of
Claims, Congress on the one hand granted appellate review, and then
through the proviso, took it away. 113 The Klein Court found that
Congress aimed to circumvent the Court of Claims’s final decision
because of the unfavorable results to the government. 114
B. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.
In 1995, Justice Scalia wrote for the court in Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc. which addressed the question of whether § 27A(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 violated the Constitution’s separation
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 146–47 (emphasis added).
Id. at 147.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
See id.
See id.
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of powers principle and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 115 The case originated in the Eastern District of Kentucky,
where Plaut brought claims against Spendthrift alleging fraud and deceit
in the selling of stock in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 as well as rule 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 116 The case was ultimately not decided on its
merits as claims brought under Rule 10b-5 had to be commenced one
year after discovery of the facts surrounding the violation and within
three years of the actual violation. 117 Thus, the statute of limitations for
Plaut’s claim had run, and the federal court accordingly dismissed the
case with prejudice. 118 In September 1991, the decision became final
because an appeal was not filed within thirty days of the dismissal. 119
Three months later, the President signed the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 into law, which gave
Plaut some new procedural options. 120 Section 476 of the Act read:
(a) Effect on pending causes of action
The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section
78j(b) of this title [§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] that
was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of
retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action
Any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that
was commenced on or before June 19, 1991—
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991,
and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles
of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be
reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after
December 19, 1991. 121

115. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 213 (1995). Specifically, the Court looked at
the constitutionality of § 10(b) of the Act’s requirement for federal courts to reopen final judgments in
private civil actions. Id. The decision was a 7–2 majority decision with Justices Rehnquist, C. J.,
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joining Justice Scalia’s opinion. Justice Breyer filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 240 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion that Justice Ginsburg joined. Id. at 246 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 214.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 214–15. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1988 ed., Supp. V)).
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Using these new procedural options, Plaut filed a motion to reinstate his
previously dismissed action; the district court found that Plaut satisfied
the statutory language, but also held that § 27A(b) was
unconstitutional. 122 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s decision. 123
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia first addressed the argument
suggesting the statute did not call on courts to reopen final judgments
because the language “the laws applicable in the jurisdiction” referenced
the law announced in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson. 124 However, Justice Scalia stated that Lampf provided a
uniform national statute of limitations, as opposed to a jurisdictionspecific one, and therefore, the new statute could not be construed as
referencing Lampf because the language would be contradictory. 125
Plaut suggested another possible reason the statute did not require
courts to reopen final decisions was that the statutory language allegedly
only applied to cases that were still pending. 126 Finding this argument
weakened in light of the fact that pending cases could not be reinstated,
Justice Scalia concluded that there was no “reasonable construction on
which § 27A(b) does not require federal courts to reopen final
judgments in suits dismissed with prejudice by virtue of Lampf.” 127
The majority opinion discussed prior Supreme Court decisions and
identified ways in which certain legislation may run counter to Article
III of the Constitution. 128 The first was the Klein doctrine, 129 which
found a statute to impermissibly limit the capacity of the judicial
department in cases before it. 130 Second, members of the Executive
Branch could not be empowered by Congress to review decisions of
Article III courts. 131 The Court found § 27A(b) different from either
scenario, so Justice Scalia focused on the “deeply rooted” power of the
Article III courts to conclusively decide matters before them as well as
the notion that only superior Article III courts had the power to review
final judgments. 132 Because § 27A(b) retroactively commanded the
federal courts to reopen final judgments, the Plaut Court found that
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 215.
Id.
Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
See supra Part III.A.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 218–19.
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Congress had disregarded the fundamental principle that only the
judiciary could issue dispositive judgments. 133
To support the conclusion that Congress had acted impermissibly, the
Court relied on documents from the pre-constitutional era which shared
a common theme: there should be a sharp division between legislative
and judicial powers. 134 Echoing this same motif, the Court also cited
Alexander Hamilton, who said:
[t]he theory neither of the British, nor the state constitutions, authorises
the revisal of a judicial sentence, by a legislative act. . . . A legislature
without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made,
in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future
cases. 135

Finally, the Court referenced case law that found the legislative branch
lacking the power to set aside, vacate, or annul a final judgment of an
Article III court. 136
The Court acknowledged that Congress could always revise Article
III court judgments by making new laws that must then be applied to
cases still pending on appeal. 137 The Court then reiterated that the
function of appellate courts was to decide cases on the law existing at
the time of the appeal, and thus, the Court discussed the feasibility of an
appellate court reversing an inferior court based on a change in the
law. 138 Justice Scalia noted a key difference between cases on appeal
and those having received final decisions: “[h]aving achieved finality,
however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial
department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress
may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that
very case was something other than what the courts said it was.” 139 In
the present case, § 27A(b) purported to allow revisiting final judgments
in cases that were properly dismissed based on statute of limitation
grounds; the Court held that no legislative act could rescind such
judgments for “even the very best of reasons, such as the legislature’s
genuine conviction (supported by all the law professors in the land) that

133. Id. at 219.
134. Id. at 220 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81).
135. Id. at 222.
136. Id. at 223–26 (referencing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Bates v. Kimball, 2 D.
Chip. 77 (Vt. 1824); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948); United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. 641, 647–48 (1875);
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1856)).
137. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
139. Id.
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the judgment was wrong; and it is violated 40 times over when 40 final
judgments are legislatively dissolved.” 140
The Klein and Plaut cases present rare times in American
jurisprudence where the Court was asked whether Congress exceeded its
constitutional powers to effectively limit the powers of the Judiciary. It
is clear the Court in both instances found the congressional act before it
to be impermissible. However, neither case explicitly dealt with nonArticle III courts. 141 Part IV will address the application of Klein and
Plaut with respect to the bankruptcy courts decisions in Chrysler and
GM.
IV. DISCUSSION
This Part develops the authority of non-Article III courts as it pertains
to their autonomy and ability to issue final judicial decisions. Upon
establishing that the bankruptcy decisions in Chrysler and GM were
final, the applicability of Klein and Plaut will be discussed. This Part
then analyzes the outcome of Section 747 and concludes that despite the
impermissible actions of Congress, Chrysler and GM will not likely
challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Finally, this Part outlines
the potential perils that accompany the precedent set forth by Section
747.
A. Finality of Decisions in Non-Article III Bankruptcy Courts
The Klein and Plaut decisions did not directly address either the
status of bankruptcy courts as non-Article III courts or their ability to
issue final decisions.
Before analyzing the Chrysler and GM
bankruptcies under Klein and Plaut, however, this subsection will
establishes that bankruptcy courts are actually quite similar to Article III
courts because of their autonomy. This subsection then suggests that the
bankruptcy decisions of Chrysler and GM were both final decisions.

140. Id. at 228.
141. Although Klein dealt with a court of claims—a non-Article III court—scholarship is quite
clear that Klein’s exact holding cannot be that narrow. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 304 (6th ed. 2009) (suggesting that
there are at least four possible interpretations of Klein: (1) Congress cannot grant jurisdiction to a certain
degree and then force jurisdiction to cease when special circumstances arise; (2) Congress cannot dictate
rules to the Judiciary for cases pending before it; (3) Congress cannot infringe on the power of the
Executive by rescinding a presidential pardon; and (4) Congress cannot make exceptions and
prescriptions to the appellate power of the Judiciary).
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1. Bankruptcy Courts Enjoy Autonomy Similar to That of Article III
Courts
The plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline makes clear the dichotomy
between Article III courts and Article I courts. For the Court, the lack of
life tenure and a fixed salary were enough to differentiate the two. 142
However, the fact that the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 only established fourteen year terms and salaries
determined by statute for bankruptcy judges does not preclude
bankruptcy courts from similar autonomy as Article III courts. To the
contrary, some scholars suggest that bankruptcy courts are actually more
insulated from political pressures despite their lack of tenure and fixed
salary. 143 Because bankruptcy judges are appointed based on their
professional merit and not on their political ideology, they are less
susceptible to outside political influence. 144
Another component of the Northern Pipeline plurality opinion was
the belief that placing non-Article III judges on par with Article III
judges could dilute the prestige and high public opinion of federal
courts. 145 However, bankruptcy courts are now widely recognized as an
extension of Article III courts. 146 As Justice White’s dissent noted in
Northern Pipeline, bankruptcy courts handle matters that Article III
judges have little interest in adjudicating. 147 It is thus not surprising that
despite the fact that Article III courts have appellate review over
bankruptcy decisions, Article III courts give great deference to
bankruptcy court decisions, and as a result, hear few cases on appeal. 148
This trend is equally present for bankruptcy decisions dealing with
142. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
143. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 747, 793 (2010) (suggesting that bankruptcy judges are independent because they are selected
on merit and not political ideology and they do not seek higher offices).
144. Id. Moreover, the “connection between the bench and the bar, and the lingering desire for
professional integrity, individualism, and reputation, provide the insulation from political actors
expected of Article III courts.” Id. at 805.
145. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60 n.10.
146. McKenzie, supra note 143, at 766 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
147. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 116 (White, J., dissenting).
148. McKenzie, supra note 143, at 777. (“There are at least three reasons for the low rate of
bankruptcy appeals. As an initial matter, the standard of review in appeals of bankruptcy decisions is
deferential to bankruptcy judges on key—and often determinative—questions. Second, the constraints
of bankruptcy litigation, with its ever-present pressures of time and concerns about draining the debtor’s
estate by litigation costs, also limit the likelihood of frequent and effective appellate review. In addition,
the Article III judiciary does not have a keen appetite for bankruptcy cases, a fact that tends to dampen
the impact of bankruptcy appeals.”). In some instances, appeals of bankruptcy court decisions have
even been given to magistrate judges before district judges. Id. at 791.
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major asset sales like Chrysler and GM, making bankruptcy courts
“immune from attack” from appellate courts in all but rare
circumstances. 149 The argument can thus be made that, practically
speaking, bankruptcy courts today are currently as impartial and immune
from political pressures as Article III judges and their decisions, when
reviewed, are given great deference by Article III courts.
2. Chrysler and GM Were Final Bankruptcy Decisions
In analyzing the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies vis-à-vis Congress’s
subsequent action, it must be determined whether the decisions were
final. In the instance of Chrysler, the finality analysis is straightforward. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 is explicit that circuit courts have appellate review of all “final
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees” when certain issues have not
been previously addressed, when a split among courts exists on an issue,
or when an immediate appeal “may materially advance the progress of
the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken.” 150 Federal
appellate courts do not, however, review the opinions, factual findings,
reasoning, or explanation of bankruptcy judges. 151 Thus, from the
statutory language, and the fact that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the case, 152 it is conclusive that In re Chrysler was a final
decision when it was issued, and the subsequent affirmation by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals only strengthened its finality.
The finality of In re General Motors is also evident. A bankruptcy
final order is one that resolves litigation, decides the merits, or
determines the rights of any party to the bankruptcy case. 153 Other
courts have determined that a bankruptcy decision is final if the
litigation is decided on the merits, and there is nothing left for the court
to do but execute the judgment. 154 Where there are activities still to be

149. Id. at 778 (citing Rachael M. Jackson, Note, Responding to Threats of Bankruptcy Abuse in a
Post-Enron World: Trusting the Bankruptcy Judge as the Guardian of Debtor Estates, 2005 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 451).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
151. Spierer v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. (In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.), 328 F.3d 829, 833
(6th Cir. 2003).
152. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 127 (2d.
Cir. 2009) (“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the June 1, 2009 order of the bankruptcy court
authorizing the Sale.”).
153. White v. Univision of Va., Inc. (In re Urban Broadcasting Corp.), 304 B.R. 263 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 401 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 2005).
154. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Farmland Indus. (In re Farmland Indus.,
Inc.), 397 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 2005).
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carried out by the court, a final decision has not been entered. 155
However, where a bankruptcy proceeding is akin to orders that were
deemed final in other bankruptcy cases, that precedent can be considered
dispositive on the similar case in question. 156
Given the definitions of finality found in the case law, Judge Gerber’s
decision in In re General Motors was final. After a very thorough
review of all the petitions before him, Judge Gerber thought that GM’s
sale to New GM was the only way to save the company in the prescribed
time frame. The only remaining action after his decision was to execute
the sale, and thus, the decision could be considered final. In addition,
aggrieved parties appealed to the district court asking it to grant a stay in
order to prevent the sale, but the court refused to overturn the
“exhaustive, careful, and thoughtful decision” and allowed the
transaction to close. 157 Finally, because the opinion of Judge Gerber
followed closely paralleled Judge Gonzalez’s In re Chrysler opinion, it
could be assumed that the circuit court’s affirmation of In re Chrysler
was dispositive for the GM decision as well. Judge Gerber’s decision
can thus be deemed a final decision because it left nothing else for the
court to do, the district court denied the stay enabling the sale, and the
Second Circuit’s affirmation in the Chrysler case was controlling in the
GM decision.
B. Applying the Holdings of Klein and Plaut to Section 747
With the bankruptcy decisions of Chrysler and GM determined to be
final, the next question is whether the enactment of Section 747 by
Congress was constitutional under Klein and Plaut. It will be suggested
that the application of Klein to Section 747 does not conclusively yield
that Congress’s actions were constitutionally impermissible. However,
because Section 747 reopens final judgments, it is unconstitutional under
Plaut.
1. Klein Analysis
A possible holding of Klein was that Congress cannot prescribe rules
that limit appellate review procedures of the judicial branch for cases
still pending. 158 This holding, however, does not directly address the
155. WRS, Inc. v. Plaza Ent., Inc., 402 F.3d 424, 427 (3d Cir. 2005).
156. Nova Info. Sys. v. Premier Operations (In re Premier Operations, Ltd.), 290 B.R. 33, 42
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
157. In re GMC, No. 09-50026, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61279 (S.D.N.Y. July, 9, 2009).
158. See supra note 141.
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constitutionality of Section 747. First, both the Chrysler and GM asset
sales were completed in the summer of 2009, making their respective
bankruptcies effectively finalized. Moreover, both decisions were final,
and, therefore, neither can be thought of as still pending. Also making
Klein inapposite in this case is that Section 747 does not change the
circumstances of the issues before the court. Even assuming the cases
were no longer pending and Section 747 did not change the
circumstances surrounding the bankruptcies, a potential application of
Klein cannot be dismissed.
It does not appear that the intent of Section 747 was to create rules
that denied courts appellate review of the bankruptcy proceedings of
Chrysler and GM. Rather, the aim of Section 747 was to create an
option for certain dealerships to be granted reinstatement of their
franchise agreements via an arbitration process. But the fact that the
statutory language does not deny appellate review may not end the
analysis. The effect of Section 747 was to give dealerships an additional
option beyond the appeal available to them during the bankruptcy
process. Thus, although dealerships had a chance to appeal the Chrysler
and GM decisions to reduce their dealership networks, Section 747
could be seen as circumventing the judicial review process by granting
appellate jurisdiction to an arbitrator that is not the Judiciary—possibly
making it legislation that might be perceived as invading the “judicial
province.” 159
Another possible holding of Klein may be that Congress cannot create
“a means to an end” to remedy an unfavorable outcome. 160 In Klein, it
was clear that members of Congress were privy to the inevitable truth
that many of those Southerners that fought against the Union would be
given back their property so long as they pledged their loyalty via an
oath. The statute was created for the sole purpose of preventing such an
inevitable outcome. 161 Similarly, Section 747 is the work of Congress to
right the wrong that purportedly resulted from the rejection of
dealerships nationwide. The House and Senate spoke of the pillars that
car dealerships represented to this country and their respective cities. 162
Congress also found the governmental taskforce assigned to evaluate the
159. Howard M. Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 57 (2010)
(suggesting that Klein may stand for the proposition that Congress should be prevented from “enacting
legislation that genuinely might so invade the judicial province”).
160. See supra note 141.
161. Senator Edmunds, in response to a question whether the provision at issue in Klein would
simply require dismissal of the appeal leaving the lower court’s judgment intact said, “No; . . . we say
they shall dismiss the case out of court for want of jurisdiction; not dismiss the appeal, but dismiss the
case—everything.” Id. (quoting Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3824 (1870)).
162. 155 CONG. REC. S13,128 (2009); 155 CONG. REC. H14,477 (2009).
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financial viability of Chrysler and GM unqualified to make judgments
on which dealerships to keep and which to terminate. 163 Similar to Klein
then, with a little less than a year before all affected dealerships would
be closing their lots, Congress stepped in to remedy a situation they
found unsatisfactory.
There are thus two possible applications of Klein to Section 747.
First, Section 747 could be seen as granting appeals to dealerships using
arbitrators, thereby bypassing an appellate review process statutorily
granted by Congress to the Judiciary. However, Congress could argue it
has the right to amend the appellate review process for non-Article III
bankruptcy courts because it originally created the appellate review
process in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984. Second, Section 747 is a clear act by Congress to correct what
they found to be an unfair result of bankruptcy. This argument is
similarly weakened considering that Congress often enacts statutes to
remedy outcomes it disagrees with. Because the two potential
applications of Klein are not particularly compelling and because Klein’s
application in general is questioned by scholars, 164 a constitutional
challenge to Section 747 under Klein is improbable.
2. Plaut Analysis
The fact pattern in Plaut, while not identical, appears quite similar to
the facts surrounding the enactment of Section 747. In Plaut, Congress
created a law that provided that any claims previously dismissed under
the old statute of limitations, that would have a different outcome with
the new statute of limitations, should be reinstated. 165 The Plaut Court
found “no instance in which Congress ha[d] attempted to set aside the
final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation.”166
Justice Scalia thus found that the new statute retroactively reopened final
judgments, and was therefore beyond the powers vested in Congress by
the Constitution. 167
As was mentioned in subsection IV.A, the Chrysler and GM
bankruptcies were final decisions. Section 747 explicitly reopens
matters that were already adjudicated and gives dealerships the right to

163. 155 CONG. REC. H14,475 (2009).
164. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (expressing uncertainty as to
the precise scope of Klein); Nat’l Coalition to Save our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d. 1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (stating “Klein’s exact meaning is far from clear”).
165. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214–15.
166. Id. at 230.
167. Id. at 227.
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appeal the rejection of their executory contracts to an arbitrator. The
intent of the statute to retroactively go around the bankruptcy court’s
final decisions cannot be ignored when looking at the final comments
made in Congress just before the bill passed:
[Senator] Stabenow[:] When negotiating an agreement for arbitration
was it the Chairman’s intent that the dealers entitled to this arbitration
process would only be the dealers that were terminated as a result of the
bankruptcy?
[Senator] Durbin[:] Yes, it is my understanding that the only
dealerships entitled to arbitration are those dealerships that were
terminated as a result of the manufacturers’ bankruptcy, rather than those
that may have closed for other business reasons. 168

Thus, because the intent of the statute is clearly to reopen final decisions
of bankruptcy courts, it is likely that a court could find Congress
exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting Section 747.
C. The Aftermath of Section 747 for GM and Chrysler
Through January 27, 2010, four hundred nine Chrysler dealerships
whose contracts were rejected during bankruptcy filed for arbitration.169
On March 6, 2010, GM announced that 661 of the roughly 1,100 dealers
that applied to go through the arbitration process would be reinstated as
part of the dealership network. 170 While these numbers suggest that the
legislation had the effect Congress intended, three questions remain: (1)
did the legislation have a beneficial effect; (2) why do not Chrysler and
GM contest the constitutionality of the congressional mandate that
forces them to arbitrate; and (3) what is to stop Congress from enacting
similar legislation in the future?
1. An Undesirable Outcome for GM and Chrysler
Listening to the voices of lawmakers, one would believe that the
outcome of their legislation was optimal.
The “short-sighted”
168. 155 CONG. REC. S13,130 (2009).
169. See Edward Niedermeyer, 1,550 Dealers Filed For Arbitration, THE TRUTH ABOUT CARS,
Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/tag/rejected-dealer/; CHRYSLER GROUP LLC AND
CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES, UNAUDITED INTERIM CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2010, at 14 (2010), available at
chryslercorp.net/pdf/news/3-31-10-financial-statement.pdf (“Approximately 400 of those rejected
dealers have filed for arbitration seeking to be added to the Company’s dealer network based on the
criteria set forth in the legislation.”).
170. Nick Bunkley, Eye on Sales, G.M. Offers to Reinstate 661 Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2010, at B1.
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bankruptcy decisions to reject dealership contracts were reversed. 171 As
a result, 661 GM dealerships and 50 Chrysler dealerships reopened their
doors. 172 The reinstatement of dealerships perhaps provided revenge
against an auto taskforce that determined the dealership network needed
to be trimmed in early 2009—the same auto taskforce deemed “a strange
collection of people that didn’t have any experience in the auto industry”
because many members did not own cars and those that did, owned
foreign cars. 173
Despite the jobs and the economic interest of the public at large, the
effect of Section 747 on GM and Chrysler has been anything but
optimal. First, although President Obama signed the bill, the same day
GM announced its reinstatement of 661 dealerships, the press reported
“[t]he White House has opposed [Section 747] over concerns that it
could hurt GM’s and Chrysler’s efforts to rebound from their
government-led bankruptcies.” 174 Second, the same sentiment was
echoed by the director of GM’s dealer network, who said, “[b]y
[reinstating dealerships], we save a lot of time, energy and dollars,
saving us and dealers from going through what could be a very long
arbitration process.” 175 Finally, the legislation ignores the rights of
creditors that likely agreed on settlement terms based on the knowledge
that the number of dealerships within Chrysler and GM would be
reduced. Despite these sentiments, Section 747 opened the door to
numerous arbitrations that were both time consuming and costly and
allowed dealerships to reopen the issues that were already deemed to
have a detrimental effect on Chrysler and GM’s competitiveness. Thus,
the end result of Congress enacting Section 747 was Chrysler and GM
agreeing to reinstate dealerships, not because it was necessarily in the
best interest of the corporation, their shareholders, or the creditors of
either, but because they could not afford to allocate the resources to deal
with all the arbitrations in the four-month window the statute provided.
2. Unlikely Constitutional Challenge
The Plaut holding is clear that Section 747 is unconstitutional because
it retroactively reopened final decisions of bankruptcy courts. However,

171. 155 CONG. REC. H14,477 (2009).
172. Nick Bunkley, Chrysler Offers Reinstatement to 86 Dealerships It Told to Close, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, at B3.
173. 155 CONG. REC. H14,475 (2009).
174. Mike Boyer, GM Will Reinstate 661 Dealerships, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 6, 2010, at
A11.
175. Bunkley, supra note 170.
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it is not surprising that GM and Chrysler have not filed any lawsuit
challenging the congressional mandate. Chrysler’s CEO, Sergio
Marchionne, has publicly expressed his desire to challenge the
constitutionality of the arbitrations, but has yet to act. 176 Marchionne
and Edward Whitacre, GM’s CEO, are in uniquely precarious positions
to take a strong stance against Congress.
Since the latter part of 2008, the economic environment that Chrysler
and GM faced was arguably unlike anything they had experienced in
their storied pasts. Their financial situations necessitated the receipt of
government bailout money that allowed them to stay in business. As
explained in subsection II.C.1, in the spring of 2009, the companies
were left with few options but to file bankruptcy and subsequently sell
their assets to create new entities. However, the structuring of the deals
left the United States Treasury essentially the owner of 12% of Chrysler
and 62% GM.
With an ownership stake in both companies, Congress justified
Section 747 as one way that taxpayers would see the quickest return on
their investment in the companies. 177 In Congress’s view, reinstating
dealerships across the nation was indubitably an action that would
benefit Chrysler and GM—notwithstanding the likelihood that the
elimination of the dealerships may actually have been in the best interest
of GM and Chrysler. Congress failed to acknowledge this possibility,
and instead, followed its own business judgment on what it thought was
best because of the possible implications on taxpayers, rather than what
Chrysler and GM independently thought was best based on the evolving
demands to be successful in the automotive industry. Regardless of
which side was “correct” in this debate, the knowledge that GM and
Chrysler may not exist without receiving troubled asset relief money
(TARP) or having the United States Treasury as a stakeholder is likely
sufficient to prevent the threat of a constitutional challenge.
Another reason why Chrysler or GM executives may be reticent to
challenge Section 747 would be the turnover of leadership prior to their
bankruptcies. Since the government has become involved with the auto
dealerships, the Obama Administration has not been shy about
threatening to replace leadership at the companies. 178 While it may be
unlikely that a constitutional challenge would lead to such a drastic
result, the federal government’s majority stake in GM makes such an
action possible. Because the United State Treasury is a large
176. Krisher, Dealers Appeal, supra note 4.
177. 155 CONG. REC. H14, 478–79 (2009).
178. Peter Valdes-Dapena, Do or Die for GM and Chrysler, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 30, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/29/news/companies/gm_bailout/index.htm.
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stakeholder in Chrysler and GM, either could effectively oust certain
leaders for unpopular moves, making a constitutional challenge of
Section 747 by Chrysler or GM unlikely.
3. A Dangerous Precedent
With a constitutional challenge of Congress’s actions by Chrysler or
GM unlikely, the precedent established by Section 747 could start a new
trend for creditors in bankruptcy. Congress felt that the bankruptcy
process was unfair to rejected Chrysler and GM dealerships. Moreover,
Congress noted that the dealerships were integral parts to communities
around America. With such rationale as an explanation for why
dealerships should be reinstated, the question becomes: What creditor,
who has had their own executory contracts rejected via a Chapter 11
bankruptcy, cannot make the same argument for Congress to grant them
arbitration, with a chance of the reinstatement of their contract? Will the
creditor have to be the same size as Chrysler and GM? Will the creditor
need to demonstrate a presence in all fifty states? Will the loss of jobs
to hundreds or thousands of American workers because of the rejected
contract be sufficient? If all are perquisites for congressional action,
perhaps few entities will qualify. However, it is fair to assume that at
least some entities could satisfy all of these arbitrary requirements, as
well as making the claim of being treated unfairly and being integral
parts to their communities. If such action by Congress gains traction, it
will undermine the authority of bankruptcy decisions because there will
always be the possibility of an exception that could be granted by
Congress.
Moreover, the repercussions of Section 747 may not be exclusively
limited to bankruptcy decisions. Because Congress has effectively
reopened final decisions of an arm of the Judiciary and has not been
challenged for its actions, there exists precedent for Congress to
retroactively act on final judicial decisions from Article I and Article III
courts in the future. In sum, the true effects of Section 747 are not yet
readily discernible but the potential for a dangerous precedent cannot be
denied.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act is likely to be
viewed as a piece of legislation that helped dealerships across the United
States re-establish their storied histories with Chrysler and GM.
Members of Congress can say they successfully represented the rights of
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their constituents by restoring employment for some and exposing others
to American automobiles and servicing facilities. To the average
observer, Section 747 gave reprieve to the victims of two iconic
bankruptcies.
However, as demonstrated in this Comment, the rejection of the
executory contracts by debtors in bankruptcy is far from extraordinary.
Such actions by debtors are commonplace in Chapter 11 reorganizations
as companies attempt to reincarnate themselves as leaner, more costefficient versions of their previous selves. Moreover, the sales of assets
as well as the rejection of franchise agreements of Chrysler and GM
were presented to bankruptcy judges and found to be permissible given
the dire financial circumstances of each corporation.
Given the final judgments of the courts on each of the bankruptcy
sales, there can be little doubt that the actions of Congress were
designed to evade the bankruptcy and appellate court rulings. Because
the decisions were not pending on appeal, and were final, it is clear that
Section 747 is retroactive legislation, and thus unconstitutional under
Plaut. However, given the unique fact that a constitutional challenge
regarding the powers of the federal government would be challenging
the same entity that is a large equity owner in each auto manufacturer,
the chances of Chrysler or GM challenging the statute is unlikely, and
therefore, creates a dangerous precedent by opening the door to similar
retroactive legislation in the future.
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